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IX. INSURANCE LAW
Mraz v. Canadian Universal Insurance Co.: Determining
When Hazardous Waste Damage Occurs for Purposes of
Insurance Coverage
In response to the growing number of environmental problems resulting
from improper disposal of hazardous wastes, in 1980 Congress enacted the
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act
(CERCLA).' Under CERCLA Congress authorizes the Environmental Pro-
tection Agency (EPA) to clean up hazardous waste sites on behalf of the
state and federal government. 2 In enacting CERCLA Congress sought to
1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9657 (1982 & Supp. III 1985), as amended by Superfund Amend-
ments and Reauthorization Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 (1986) (to be
codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). Congress enacted the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA) in 1980. Id.; see Com-
ment, Successor Landowner Suits for Recovery of Hazardous Waste Cleanup Costs: CERCLA
Section 107(a)(4), 33 UCLA L. REv. 1737, 1739-42 & nn.16-29 (1986) (summarizing history of
CERCLA's enactment). In 1986 Congress amended CERCLA by enacting the Superfund
Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 (SARA). Superfund Amendment and Reau-
thorization Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 (1986) (to be codified as amended
in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). SARA extended the effective date of CERCLA from 1986
until December 31, 1990. SARA, 42 U.S.C. § 511 (1986). In addition, SARA provides the
government with guidelines for cleaning up and making settlements with parties responsible
for hazardous waste disposal. Id. at §§ 121, 122, 205 (1986).
While Congress has provided little legislative history behind the enactment of CERCLA,
Congress enacted CERCLA for two primary purposes. See CERCLA Defendants: The Problem
of Expanding Liability and Diminishing Defenses, 31 WAst. U.J. URE. & CorEmp. L. 289,
289 (1987) [hereinafter, CERCLA Defendants] (discussing legislative history and purposes of
CERCLA). See generally H. REP. No. 1016, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 5, reprinted in CERCLA,
1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADmI. NEws 6119, 6153 (same). First, CERCLA provides an
expeditious and efficient means for the federal government to remove hazardous wastes.
CERCLA Defendants, supra, at 289. Accordingly, CERCLA authorizes the government to
clean up a hazardous waste site before litigating a party's liability for improperly dumping the
wastes. Id. In addition, Congress created a fund under CERCLA to provide the government
with funds to clean up a hazardous waste site (the Superfund). Id. Second, in enacting
CERCLA, Congress intended to impose liability on parties responsible for disposing toxic
substances. Id. Thus, the parties involved in the dumping of hazardous wastes must reimburse
the Superfund for the costs originally paid by the government to clean up the sites. Id.
In addition to the federal government enacting a statute to expedite the clean up of and
removal of hazardous wastes, approximately half of the states have enacted statutes similar in
substance to CERCLA. See Hadzi-Antich, Coverage for Environmental Liabilities Under the
Comprehensive General Liability Insurance Policy: How to Walk a Bull Through a China
Shop, 17 CONN. L. REv. 769, 774 & nn.31-38 (1985) (discussing state legislation similar to
CERCLA). States have created various types of funds to finance clean ups under state statute.
Id. at 774 & n.32. Some statutes finance only certain types of hazardous waste damage while
other statutes are comprehensive. Id. at 774 & nn.32-37.
2. § 107(a)(4)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(A) (1982 & Supp. III 1985). In addition to
authorizing the state and federal government to clean up hazardous waste sites, CERCLA
authorizes private individuals to clean up hazardous waste sites. § 107(a)(4)(B), 42 U.S.C. §
9607 (1982 & Supp. III 1985). Individuals may seek reimbursement for the clean up costs either
WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 45:797
expedite the government's clean up of hazardous waste sites by providing
the government with immediately available funds through a fund known as
the Superfund. 3 The Superfund enables the government to clean up hazard-
ous waste sites before establishing a party's liability for dumping the
hazardous wastes. 4 Once the government establishes liability, however, com-
panies and owners of companies responsible for discharging toxic substances
into the environment are strictly liable for reimbursing the Superfund for
any costs the government incurs in cleaning up the toxic wastes.5
from the party responsible for the improper dumping of hazardous wastes or from the
Superfund. § 107(a)(4)(B), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(B) (1982 & Supp. III 1985). If a private
party seeks reimbursement from the Superfund, CERCLA states that the individual's clean up
must comply with the standards set by the National Contingency Plan. Id.; see generally
CERCLA Defendants, supra note 1, at 305-307 nn.125-139 (describing right of state and
federal government as well as individuals to clean up dump sites under CERCLA); Note, The
Right to Contribution for Response Costs Under CERCLA, 60 NoTRE DAKE L. REv. 345,
349-50 & nn.35-6 (1985) (describing procedure to obtain reimbursement for clean up from the
Superfund).
3. 42 U.S.C. § 9631 (1982 & Supp. III 1985); see Note, supra note 2, at 345, 349-50 &
nn.35-8 (1985) (describing Superfund). Under the 1986 amendments to CERCLA, Congress
increased the amount appropriated to the Superfund from $1,600,000,000 to a maximum of
$8,500,000,000 over the next five years to the Superfund. Sara, 42 U.S.C. § 111 (1986).
Congress finances the Superfund by imposing excise taxes on producers of oil and gas. See
§§ 511-14, 42 U.S.C. § 4611(d) (1982 & Supp. III 1985) (describing imposition of taxes financing
CERCLA). Congress also imposes excise taxes on operators of hazardous waste sites and
generators of chemical and petroleum products to finance the Superfund. § 211, 26 U.S.C. §§
4611, 4612, 4661, 4662 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
4. § 107, 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (1982 & Supp. III 1985). The Superfund speeds up the clean
up of hazardous wastes because the Superfund eliminates the need to establish a party's
liability and provides the government with funds to clean up the hazardous waste site. See
Note, supra note 2, at 349-50 nn.35-39 (describing how Superfund facilitates government's
clean up of hazardous waste sites). However, before the government or a private party can
make a successful claim against the Superfund, the government or private party must satisfy
certain prerequisites. See Bulk Distribution Centers, Inc. v. Monsanto Co., 589 F. Supp. 1437,
1442 nn.11-14 (S.D. Fla. 1984) (outlining steps required to file claim against Superfund); Note,
supra note 2, at 350-51 & nn.40-47 (describing prerequisites necessary to obtain reimbursement
under CERCLA for clean up costs). First, hazardous wastes must be released. See § 101(22),
42 U.S.C. § 9601 (1982 & Supp. III 1985) (defining release as spillage, leakage or discharge
into the environment); Note, supra note 2, at 350 & nn.40 & 42 (discussing definition of
release). Second, the release of the hazardous wastes must constitute a "reportable quantity,"
defined as harmful amounts of wastes under the Clean Water Act. See 40 C.F.R. §§ 117.1(a),
117.3 (1987) (defining reportable quantities and amounts of hazardous wastes considered
harmful); supra notes 1 & 3 and accompanying text (describing how Superfund expedites
government's clean up of hazardous wastes). Once the government establishes that an individual
has released a reportable quantity of hazardous wastes, the government may proceed to clean
up the waste. See Constitutional Implications of CERCLA: Due Process Challenges to Response
Costs and Retroactive Liability, 31 WASH. U.J. URB. & CONT MP. L. 279, 279 & n.3 (1987)
(describing government's clean up). CERCLA refers to the government's costs in cleaning up
hazardous waste sites as response costs. See id. (describing response costs).
5. § 107, 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (1982 & Supp. III 1985); see Comment, Personal Liability
for Hazardous Waste Cleanup: An Examination of CERCLA Section 107, 13 B.C. ENVTL.
AsF. L. Rav. 643, 653 (1986) (describing liability of parties discharging hazardous wastes).
Courts have concluded that CERCLA imposes strict liability as well as joint and several
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As a result of the liability provisions under CERCLA, companies
handling the storage of hazardous wastes have submitted an increased
number of claims for environmental damages to insurance carriers.6 Usually
insurance companies issue a standardized general liability policy to compa-
nies handling hazardous wastes. 7 A general liability policy typically insures
liability on responsible parties. See Bulk Distribution Centers, Inc. v. Monsanto Co., 589 F.
Supp. 1437, 1442-3 nn.15-16 (S.D. Fla. 1984) (finding that CERCLA imposes strict liability and
joint and several liability on parties responsible for hazardous waste damage); Lotz, Liability
Issues under CERCLA, 23 A.F.L. REv. 370 (1982-83) (discussing strict liability and retroactive
application of CERCLA); Comment, supra, at 655-57 nn.106-31 (discussing courts' interpretation
of strict liability provisions under CERCLA). CERCLA provides little opportunity for a
defendant to avoid liability. See § 107(b), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b) (1982 & Supp. III 1985)
(describing defenses to allegations of liability under CERCLA). Accordingly, courts only find
for defendants in a CERCLA proceeding if the defendant successfully proves that the releases
of hazardous wastes resulted from an act of God, nuclear war or an act of a third party not
related to the defendant. §§ 107(b)()-(3), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b)(l)-(3) (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
Thus, CERCLA imposes a heavy burden on potential defendants because of the limited
defenses available to the defendant. Comment, supra, at 654-55 & nn.100-05.
CERCLA also imposes criminal and civil liability on parties responsible for improper
disposal of hazardous wastes. §§ 103, 106-07, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9603, 9606-07 (1982 & Supp. III
1985); Comment, supra, at 644 & nn.13-14 (describing civil and criminal liability provisions
under CERCLA). Section 107 of CERCLA provides that owners and operators of hazardous
waste facilities, transporters of hazardous wastes and generators of hazardous wastes are civilly
liable for the improper disposal of hazardous wastes and subject to liability for the government's
clean up costs. § 107(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1982 & Supp. III 1985); see § 103, 42 U.S.C. §
9603 (1982 & Supp. III 1985) (describing criminal liability under CERCLA); Comment, supra,
at 644-46 nn.12-16 & 30-32 (describing civil and criminal liability under CERCLA for improper
disposal of hazardous wastes). In addition, courts have found corporate officers liable under
section 107 of CERCLA for a corporation's improper disposal of hazardous wastes. See
Comment, supra, at 660-61 & nn.160-65 (discussing corporate officers' liability under CERCLA).
Furthermore, a party's liability for hazardous waste damage attaches even though the respon-
sible party did not foresee that the disposal of hazardous wastes would result in damage. See
United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical and Chem. Co., 579 F. Supp. 823, 847-48 (W.D.
Mo. 1984) (holding that person as used in CERCLA includes officers and employees of
corporation), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 810 F.2d 726 (8th Cir. 1986); see Comment, supra,
643-71 (examining application of CERCLA to individuals and extent of individual liability for
government's clean up costs of hazardous waste).
6. See Chesler, Rodburg & Smith, Patterns of Judicial Interpretation of Insurance
Coverage For Hazardous Waste Site Liability, 18 RUTGERS L.J. 9, 9-20 (1986) (summarizing
various provisions of CERCLA and response of insurance industry to hazardous waste liability).
Most of the litigation arising under CERCLA involves a suit brought by the government
against a policy holder of an expired policy. Insurers' Liability under CERCLA: Shifting
Hazardous Waste Site Cleanup Costs to the Insurance Industry, 31 WASH. U.J. URB. &
CorrEmp. L. 259, 265-68 (1987) (examining development of insurance policies covering haz-
ardous wastes and concluding that insurers have broad duty to defend or indemnify insured
in CERCLA litigation) [hereinafter Insurers' Liability under CERCLA]; H. Kaplan, J. Balloun,
S. Stigall, Defense Strategies and Insurance Coverage Issues in a "Superfund" Case, 53 INs.
CouNs. J. 554, 558 (1986) (discussing effect of CERCLA and defense strategy in insurance
coverage controversies).
7. See Hadzi-Antich, supra note 1, at 769-70 & nn.4-6 (discussing development of
general liability insurance). Insurance companies usually issue a standardized policy known as
Comprehensive General Liability (CGL) insurance to parties handling the storage of hazardous
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the policy holder against an occurrence, defined as unintended or unexpected
damages to a third party's property, including injurious exposure to con-
ditions resulting in property damage. 8 While most property damage occurs
almost simultaneously with a wrongful event or condition that causes
damage, hazardous waste damage causes slow, continuous and degenerative
property damage over a long period of time.9 Therefore, the dumping of
wastes. Id. at 778 n.69. A CGL policy insures the holder of the policy against property damage
or bodily injury to a third party rather than to the policy holder. Id. at 778. Under a CGL
policy, the carrier usually agrees to defend the insured against claims for property damage
and injuries. Id.; see generally Arness & Eliason, Insurance Coverage for "Property Damage"
in Asbestos and Other Toxic Tort Cases, 72 VA. L. REv. 943, 946-48 (1986) (discussing
standardized CGL insurance coverage provisions).
8. See Hadzi-Antich, supra note 1, at 779 (discussing how occurrence triggers insurance
coverage). For a policy to cover a claim for property damage, the claim must fall within the
policy's definition for property damage. Chesler, Rodburg & Smith, supra note 6, at 13 n.27.
Typically, the standard definition of property damage includes physical destruction or loss of
use of the property at any time during the policy period. Id. In addition, property damage
includes property that is not physically destroyed, but is no longer useful for purposes of the
insured. Id.
Prior to 1966 insurance policies covered property damage only when the damage occurred
as a result of an accident. See Hadzi-Antich, supra note 1, at 779. Generally, the policies
contain a pollution exclusion clause stating that insurance coverage does not apply to property
damage caused by the release of various contaminants, smoke, chemicals, and other irritants
unless the release is "sudden and accidental." See Chesler, Rodburg & Smith, supra note 6,
at 13 (discussing pollution exclusion clause). In 1966, however, insurance companies revised the
language in CGL policies to provide coverage for an occurrence, rather than an accident. See
Hadzi-Antich, supra note 1, at 779-80 (discussing insurance industry's switch from accident to
occurrence as trigger for coverage). Generally, policies define an "occurrence" as "an accident,
including injurious exposure to conditions, which results, during the policy period, in bodily
injury or property damage neither expected nor intended by the insured." See Chesler, Rodburg
& Smith, supra note 6, at 31 (discussing definition of occurrence in insurance policies). The
shift from the term accident to the term occurrence broadened insurance coverage and created
two important changes in favor of the insured. Id. at 31-32. First, the insured's coverage is
no longer limited to damage resulting from sudden events because the definition of occurrence
in CGL policies includes injurious exposure to conditions. Id. at 31 n. 115. Second, even though
the insured intended to commit the act giving rise to property damage, the policy covers the
claim for damage if the insured did not expect the intentional act to result in damage. Id.
Accordingly, the shift from the term accident to occurrence broadened insurance coverage
because the term occurrence covers a broader range of events. Id.
Most CGL policies require the insurer to defend the insured against any third party claim
even if the claim has no merit. Id. at 17. In attempting to determine whether the insurer has
a duty to defend the insured against a claim for property damage, most jurisdictions invoke
the comparison test to determine whether the third party's claim falls under the provisions of
the policy. Id. at 17 n.38. Under the comparison test, the court compares the allegations
against the insured in the third party's complaint with the policy provisions. Id. If the court
finds that the allegations against the insured are covered under the policy, the court holds that
the insurer has a duty to defend the insured in the third party's suit. Id.
9. See Continental Ins. Cos. v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical and Chem. Co., 811 F.2d
1180, 1189-90 (8th Cir.) (noting property damage begins immediately upon exposure to hazardous
wastes, though damage remains latent over a period of time), reh'g granted, 815 F.2d 51 (1987);
Insurer's Liability under CERCLA, supra note 6, at 275 (stating that damage may not manifest
until long after hazardous waste exposure because hazardous wastes cause slow continuous
damage to property).
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the hazardous wastes may take place during the policy period, while the
resulting property damage may not appear until after the policy period
expires.' 0 Since the third party complainant often.fails to discover property
damage resulting from hazardous waste exposure until after the policy
period expires, the insured and insurer typically dispute whether the property
damage took place within the meaning of the policy's definition of an
occurrence." The insured argues that even though the complainant did not
discover the property damage until after the policy period expired, the
property's exposure to the hazardous wastes took place during the policy
period and, therefore, the damage is covered under the policy.' 2 The insurer,
however, argues that because the complainant did not discover the property
damage until after the policy period expired, the damage did not take place
within the meaning of the policy's definition of an occurrence and, therefore,
the insurer refuses to defend or indemnify the insured against the third
party complainant's claim for property damage.' 3
In construing the definition of an occurrence, courts commonly use one
of three rules: the exposure rule, the manifestation rule, or the injury in
fact rule.' 4 Under the exposure rule courts require an insurer to provide
coverage to an insured if exposure to the substance causing property damage
took place during the policy period. 5 In contrast, courts applying the
10. See Continental Ins. Cos. v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical and Chem. Co., 811 F.2d
1180, 1182-83 (8th Cir.) (drums released chemicals in 1971, but complainant failed to discover
damage until 1980 after insurance policies had expired), reh'g granted, 815 F.2d 51 (1987); CPS
Chem. Co. v. The Continental Ins. Co., 199 N.J. Super. 558, 565, 489 A.2d 1265, 1269 (1984)
(company dumped hazardous wastes during policy period, but complainant failed to discover
damage until after policy period expired), rev'd on other grounds, 203 N.J. Super. 15, 594
A.2d 886 (1985).
11. See Chesler, Rodburg & Smith, supra note 6, at 13 (stating that parties dispute
insurance policy's definition of occurrence).
12. See Keene Corp. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 667 F.2d 1034, 1039 (D.C. Cir. 1981)
(discussing insured's argument that bodily injury began before the disease manifest), cert.
denied, 455 U.S. 1007 (1982) .
13. See id. (discussing insurers' argument that manifestation of the disease triggers
insurance coverage).
14. See Hadzi-Antich, supra note 1, at 781 (stating that courts adopt certain rules to
determine time of occurrence for property damage); Note, Adjudicating Asbestos Insurance
Liability: Alternatives to Contract Analysis, 97 HAgv. L. REv. 739, 740-43 (discussing various
theories to determine when occurrence takes place). See infra notes 15-17, 50 & 76 and
accompanying text (describing exposure rule, manifestation rule and injury in fact rules and
courts' use of rules to determine when property damage takes place).
15. See Hadzi-Antich, supra note 1, at 782 (describing exposure rule). Under the exposure
rule an occurrence takes place at the time an event or substance is exposed to property which
causes injury or damage to the complainant or complainant's property. See Insurance Co. of
N. Am. v. Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc., 633 F.2d 1212, 1223 (6th Cir. 1980) (adopting exposure
rule to determine when occunrrence takes place) aff'd and clarified on reh'g, 657 F.2d 814,
cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1109 (1981). One commentator argues that since damage does not always
result from exposure to a potentially dangerous substance, the exposure rule is not reliable in
determining the time of an occurrence. Hadzi-Antich, supra note 1, at 782. See infra note 18
(listing courts adopting exposure rule).
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manifestation rule require an insurer to cover any damage that a third party
complainant discovers during the policy period. 6 Finally courts adopting
the injury in fact rule require an insurer to provide coverage for any damage
that in fact took place during the policy period. 7 Courts construing the
time of damage resulting from hazardous waste exposure generally have
adopted the exposure rule." In Mraz v. Canadian Universal Insurance
16. See Hadzi-Antich, supra note 1, at 782 (describing manifestation rule). Under the
manifestation rule, an occurrence takes place when a person discovers the property damage.
See id. (discussing manifestation rule's application to bodily injury). Authorities also refer to
the manifestation rule as the apparent injury rule. Id. at 782 & n.89; see Appalachian Ins.
Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 676 F.2d 56, 62 (3d Cir. 1982) (adopting manifestation rule).
17. See Hadzi-Antich, supra note 1, at 782 nn.84-89 (describing injury in fact rule).
Under the injury in fact rule, an occurrence takes place if the insured proves an actual injury
occurred during the policy period. Id. Thus, the injury in fact rule does not require the
complainant to prove the complainant discovered the injury during the policy period, but that
the complainant's injury or property damage actually took place during the policy period. Id.;
See infra note 80 (listing cases adopting injury in fact rule). Some courts have adopted the
diagnosable injury rule, a modification of the injury in fact rule, to determine when property
damage takes place. See Hadzi-Antich, supra note I, at 783 nn.95-98 (describing diagnosable
injury rule). Under the diagnosable injury rule, courts require a professional's diagnosis to
determine when injury takes place. See id. at 783 n.95 (limiting discussion of diagnosable
injury rule's application to bodily injury); Sandoz, Inc. v. Employer's Liab. Assurance Corp.,
554 F.Supp. 257, 266 (D.N.J. 1983) (adopting diagnosable injury rule and stating that insurers'
liability would be determined on remand upon proof of medical evidence showing when injury
in fact occurred). Thus, the diagnosable discovery rule requires a professional's independent
judgment that an injury took place during the policy period in order for the policy to cover
the claim. Hadzi-Antich, supra note I, at 783 n.95. Accordingly, the diagnosable discovery
rule imposes a stricter standard than the injury in fact rule which must be met before the
insured receives coverage for a claim. Id.
18. See Insurers Liability under CERCLA, supra note 6, at 275 & n.102 (stating that
courts generally apply exposure rule to determine whether release of hazardous wastes is an
occurrence for insurance coverage). While courts have primarily adopted the exposure rule in
cases involving hazardous waste damage, courts have not yet addressed whether the court's
use of the exposure rule requires the complaining party to prove an injury in fact at the time
of exposure. Id. Thus, in cases involving property damage from hazardous waste exposure, it
is unclear whether courts have adopted the exposure rule or the injury in fact rule to determine
the time of damage. Id.; see also Continental Ins. Cos. v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical and
Chem. Co., 811 F.2d 1180, 1190 & n.26 (8th Cir.) (using exposure rule to determine time of
property damage and stating that majority of jurisdictions have adopted the exposure rule to
determine coverage in litigation involving degenerative injury), reh'g granted, 815 F.2d 51
(1987); CPS Chem. Co. v. The Continental Ins. Co., 199 N.J. Super. 558, 565-66, 489 A.2d
1265, 1269 (1984) (adopting exposure rule to determine when property damage occurs from
hazardous waste damage), rev'd and remanded on other grounds, 203 N.J. Super. 15, 495
A.2d 886 (1985); Buckeye Union Ins. Co. v. Liberty Solvents and Chems. Co., 17 Ohio App.
3d 127, -, 477 N.E.2d 1227, 1233 (1984) (holding that insurer had duty to defend when
hazardous wastes were released into environment).
In addition to adopting the exposure rule, manifestation rule and injury in fact rule,
courts have combined the exposure rule and manifestation rule to create two additional rules.
See Hadzi-Antich, supra note 1, at 784-85 (describing double trigger rule and triple trigger
rule as variations of exposure rule and manifestation rule). The two rules are known as the
double trigger rule and the triple trigger rule. Id. Under the double trigger rule, an occurrence
takes place both at the time of exposure to the event resulting in injury and at the time the
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Co.,19 however, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
adopted the manifestation rule to determine when hazardous waste damage
occurs for purposes of insurance coverage.
20
In Mraz Galaxy Chemicals, Inc. (Galaxy), a chemical corporation con-
trolled by the plaintiffs, Paul J. and Sally Mraz (the plaintiffs) stored certain
chemical wastes in drums buried in a clay pit in 1969.21 Canadian Universal
Insurance Company (the defendant) had issued a general liability insurance
policy in which the defendant agreed to indemnify and defend Galaxy and
the plaintiffs against any legal obligations resulting from property damage
caused by an occurrence.? Under the policy, an occurrence took place if
the plaintiffs did not intend or expect the property damage to take place
as a result of the plaintiffs' actions?23 The policy defined an occurrence to
include exposure to conditions which results in unexpected or unintended
property damage during the policy period.u The policy period began January
1, 1969 and ended January 1, 1970. 21
injury manifests itself. Id. at 785. The triple trigger rule provides coverage from the time of
exposure up to and including the time the complainant discovers the bodily injury or property
damage. Id. at 784. Accordingly, the triple trigger rule gives broader insurance coverage for
the insured than the exposure rule, the manifestation rule, the injury in fact rule or the double
trigger rule. Id. at 784.
19. 804 F.2d 1325 (4th Cir. 1986).
20. Mraz v. Canadian Universal Ins. Co., 804 F.2d 1325, 1328 (4th Cir. 1986).
21. Id. at 1326. In Mraz Mr. and Mrs. Mraz (the plaintiffs) incorporated Galaxy as a
solvent recycling plant in 1960. Id. Soon after Galaxy began operating, parties complained
that the plant was releasing odors. Mraz v. American Universal Ins. Co., 616 F. Supp. 1173,
1176 (D. Md. 1985). As a result, certain state agencies, including the county health department
investigated the complaints. Id. In 1969 the state filed an action against the company in the
Circuit Court for Cecil County, Maryland. Id. As a result the court declared Galaxy a public
nuisance. Id. In 1970 a neighborhood group successfully sued Galaxy for bodily injuries
resulting from the fumes. Id. In response to the state's and neighborhood group's suits, Galaxy
arranged to remove approximately 1300 barrels of chemical wastes from the plant site. Id.
Galaxy previously had stored drums containing chemical wastes at the plant site before
processing the materials. Id. State and county health officials worked with Galaxy in planning
the removal and burial of the hazardous wastes. Id. Galaxy and state and county officials
arranged to bury the chemical wastes in steel drums in a clay pit located on land known as
the Leslie site. Id. The plaintiffs thought that the clay pit would form a barrier against any
possible leakage of the chemicals from the drums. Id.
22. Mraz, 804 F.2d at 1327. In Mraz Canadian Universal Insurance Company (the
defendant) had issued a policy insuring Galaxy against claims resulting from Galaxy's opera-
tions. Id. In addition the policy insured both of the plaintiffs, individually and within the
scope of the plaintiffs' respective corporate duties at Galaxy. Id. The policy defined property
damage as "injury to or destruction of tangible property." Id. The policy defined an occurrence
as "an accident, including injurious exposure to conditions, which results, during the policy
period, in bodily injury or property damage, neither expected nor intended from the standpoint
of the insured." Id.
23. See supra note 22 and accompanying text (describing policy's definition of occurrence
in Mraz).
24. Id.
25. Mraz, 804 F.2d at 1326.
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In 1981 the EPA notified the plaintiffs that the buried wastes were
hazardous and that the plaintiffs must clean up the dump site. 26 When the
plaintiffs refused to clean up the wastes, the EPA removed and cleaned up
the hazardous substances at the dump site. 27 Subsequently the United States
filed an action (the Government's Complaint) pursuant to CERCLA against
the plaintiffs to recover the costs that the government had incurred in
cleaning up the hazardous wastes. 28 In response to the allegations contained
in the Government's Complaint, the plaintiffs sought coverage under the
policy the defendant had issued.29 Upon the defendant's refusal to defend
or indemnify the plaintiffs, the plaintiffs filed a declaratory judgment action
in the United States District Court for the District of Maryland to determine
the defendant's duties under the policy.30 To support the plaintiffs' claim
that the defendant had a duty to defend and indemnify the plaintiffs, the
plaintiffs contended that property damage had occurred during the policy
period because the chemicals began leaking and damaging property imme-
26. Id. In Mraz the State of Maryland and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
conducted a study of the Leslie site and found that the drums buried at the Leslie site were
hazardous. Id. Accordingly, the EPA ordered the plaintiffs to clean up the wastes or to pay
for the government's costs of cleaning up the Leslie site. Id. When the plaintiffs refused to
comply with the EPA's order, the EPA and the state of Maryland removed the buried drums
from the Leslie site, removed and disposed of the contaminated soil located at the site, and
treated the water contaminated from the chemicals buried at the site. Id. After the EPA and
the state removed the wastes, the EPA asked Galaxy to reimburse the government for the
clean up costs, but Galaxy refused. Id. Accordingly the United States Government filed suit
against the plaintiffs to recover the costs of the clean up under CERCLA. Id.; see U.S. v.
Bissell, Civ. No. Y-83-3745 (D. Md. Oct. 1983) (describing federal government's suit against
the plaintiffs to recover cost of clean up).
27. Mraz, 804 F.2d at 1326.
28. See id. (describing government's suit against plaintiffs). In Mraz the Court of Appeals
stated that the United States and the State of Maryland had filed the Bissell complaint (the
Government's Complaint) in the United Sates District Court for the District of Maryland. Id.
In the Government's Complaint, the United States alleged that the Leslie site had emitted
hazardous substances into the surrounding air, water, and soil before the government cleaned
up the site. Mraz v. American Universal Ins. Co., 616 F. Supp. 1173, 1177 (D. Md. 1985). The
Government's Complaint alleged that the emissions caused an offensive smell and discolored
a stream located near the Leslie site. Id. As a result, the government alleged the hazardous
waste release threatened the health of area residents. Id. In addition, the government alleged
that Galaxy was at least partially responsible for the release of the hazardous wastes. Id.
Specifically, the United States and the State of Maryland sought reimbursement from the
plaintiffs for the costs incurred in cleaning up and removing wastes from the Leslie site, as
well as the administrative costs, fees and interest incurred in the removal of the hazardous
wastes and related damage. Id.
29. Mraz, 804 F.2d at 1326.
30. Mraz v. American Universal Ins. Co., 616 F. Supp. 1173, 1177 (D. Md. 1985). In
Mraz the plaintiffs and Galaxy originally filed suit against American Universal Insurance
Company in the Circuit Court for Cecil County, Maryland in 1984. Id. at 1175. On the basis
of diversity, the case was removed to the district court where the Government's Complaint
was pending. Id. The Mraz complaint was amended to include the defendant in 1985. Id. The
court dismissed American Universal Insurance Co. from the suit. Id. In 1985 the court
conducted a bench trial. Id. The district court entered judgment for the plaintiffs based on
the evidence and oral arguments presented by the plaintiffs and defendant at trial. Id.
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diately after the plaintiffs buried the drums in 1969. 3' Thus, the plaintiffs
claimed that the chemicals had leaked during the policy period causing
immediate damage to the surrounding property.3 2 The defendant argued,
however, that the property damage did not occur until after the policy's
term expired in 1970 because the EPA did not notify Galaxy that the buried
chemicals were hazardous until 1981. 31 Therefore, the defendant contended
that the defendant had no duty to defend the plaintiffs against the claims
for property damages because the Government's Complaint had alleged no
occurrence under the terms of the insurance policy.
3
Having heard the plaintiffs' and defendant's arguments, the district
court in Mraz adopted the exposure rule to determine when the property
damage occurred and held that the act of burying hazardous wastes was an
occurrence since the plaintiffs did not intend the resulting damage.3 1 In so
holding, the court stated that while the plaintiffs intended to store the
chemical wastes in a clay pit, the plaintiffs did not expect or intend for the
drums or the pit to leak.3 6 Reasoning that insurance companies intend to
cover a broad range of occurrences, the Mraz court concluded that the
policy's language covered the plaintiffs' claim because the leakage of the
chemicals constituted property damage occurring during the policy period.3 7
Since the complaint alleged that property damage had accrued at the time
the plaintiffs buried the drums, the court reasoned that property damage
occurred during the policy period.3 Thus, the district court held that the
31. Id. at 1177.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 1178.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 1179. In Mraz the district court held that the defendant had a duty to defend
and possibly indemnify the plaintiffs against the allegations in the Government's Complaint.
Id. In so holding, the district court adopted the exposure rule, reasoning that the purpose of
the trial was neither to verify the factual allegations in the Government's Complaint nor to
determine whether the defendant must pay for the damages claimed by the federal government
for the clean up. Id. Rather, the district court stated that the function of the trial was to
determine whether Canadian Universal had a duty to defend the plaintiffs in the government's
suit. Id. The district court stated that the outcome of the government's action ultimately would
determine whether the policy covered the plaintiff. Id. However, for purposes of the Mraz
action the court reasoned that the court need only consider whether the Government's
Complaint alleged an occurrence within the meaning of the policy. Id. The district court read
the Government's Complaint to state that property damage began to take place at the time
the plaintiffs dumped the chemicals in 1969. Id. The district court stated that the court could
read the complaint to state that hazardous substances had been released from the drums, that
the release had discolored a stream and that the result of the release was the air smelled bad
in 1969. Id.; see supra note 28 and accompanying text (describing allegations in the Govern-
ment's Complaint).
36. American Universal Ins. Co., 616 F. Supp. at 1178.
37. Id.
38. Id. In Mraz the district court compared the allegations in the Government's Complaint
with the provisions in the insurance policy and concluded that the defendant had a duty to
defend and possibly indemnify the plaintiffs against the allegations in the Government's
Complaint. Id. at 1177. See supra note 28 and accompanying text (describing allegations in
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defendant had a duty to defend and possibly to indemnify the plaintiffs
against the claims for property damage alleged in the Government's Com-
plaint.3 9 As a result of the court's decision, the defendant appealed the
district court's decision to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit.40
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit adopted the manifestation rule and held
that an occurrence takes place when a third party complainant or an insured
discovers property damage from hazardous waste exposure. 4 The Fourth
Circuit reasoned that damage resulting from hazardous wastes is latent and
generally occurs over a long period of time.4 2 The court indicated that under
the exposure rule or injury in fact rule a complaining party would have
difficulty determining when the leaking began or when the property damage
began to take place because the complainant might not discover the damage
until years after a company dumps the hazardous wastes. 43 Accordingly, the
Fourth Circuit stated that the property damage alleged in the Government's
Complaint did not occur until after the policy period expired in 1970
because the EPA did not determine that the plaintiffs' dump site constituted
a hazard until 1981. 44 Thus, the Mraz court held that the defendant had no
duty to defend or indemnify the plaintiffs because neither the government
nor the insured had discovered the hazardous waste damage during the
policy period.
45
In addition, the Mraz court supported the use of the manifestation rule
to determine when property damage occurs on the basis of the wording of
the policy.46 The policy defined an occurrence as an accident resulting in
the destruction of physical property during the policy period.4 7 The Fourth
Government's Complaint); note 22 and accompanying text (describing provisions in insurance
policy). Accordingly, the district court stated that Canadian Universal had a duty to defend
the plaintiffs in the government's suit because the allegations contained in the Government's
Complaint potentially fell within the meaning of the policy. American Universal Ins. Co., 616
F. Supp. at 1179. The Mraz district court stated that while the plaintiffs' burial of the wastes
was intentional, the release of the chemicals from the drums was unintentional. Id. at 1178.
The district court found that since the release of chemical substances resulted from the ruptured
drums after the drums were buried, the release did not constitute an expected or intended
event. Id. Thus, the court reasoned that the policy possibly covered the property damage from
the hazardous waste exposure. See supra note 22 and accompanying text (discussing policy's
definition of occurrence and definition's inclusion of unexpected and unintended events).
Accordingly, the court found that the defendant had a duty to defend the plaintiffs against
the allegations in the Government's Complaint. Id.
39. See supra note 38 and accompanying text (discussing Mraz district court's reasoning).
40. Mraz v. Canadian Universal Ins. Co., 804 F.2d 1325, 1326 (4th Cir. 1986).
41. Id. at 1328.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id. See supra note 28 and accompanying text (describing allegations in Government's
Complaint).
45. Mraz, 804 F.2d at 1328.
46. Id. at 1327.
47. Id. See supra note 22 (describing policy's definition of occurrence).
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Circuit noted, however, that the Government's Complaint alleged that the
release of the chemicals polluted the air, water and soil necessitating that
the government clean up the dump site in 1982.48 The Fourth Circuit stated
that since the allegations in the Government's Complaint did not indicate
that the damage occurred during the policy period no property damage
occurred during the policy period.
49
In contrast to the Fourth Circuit's use of the manifestation rule in
Mraz, other jurisdictions deciding cases involving hazardous waste damage
primarily have adopted the exposure rule to determine the time of an
occurrence. 0 For example, in CPS Chemical Co. v. Continental Insurance
Co.,5  the Superior Court of New Jersey held that an occurrence under an
insurance policy takes place at the time an insured exposes property to
hazardous wastes.52 In CPS several insurance companies issued general
liability policies insuring a company against claims arising from property
damage caused by an occurrence.53 The policies defined an occurrence as
an accident or exposure to conditions resulting in property damage. 54 The
insured company contracted to have hazardous wastes removed from the
insured's operations.5 5 However, the company the insured contracted to
remove the wastes illegally dumped the insured company's waste in the city
48. Mraz, 804 F.2d at 1327. See supra note 28 and accompanying text (describing
allegations in Government's Complaint).
49. Mraz, 804 F.2d at 1327. In Mraz the policy period commenced in 1969 and ended
in 1970.
50. See Steyer v. Westvaco Corp., 450 F.Supp. 384, 388 (D. Md. 1978) (holding that
occurrence under meaning of policy took place when mill discharged polluting substances into
air); CPS Chem. Co. v. Continental Ins. Co., 199 N.J. Super. 558, 565-66, 489 A.2d 1265,
1269 (1984) (holding that occurrence took place when company illegally dumped insured's toxic
wastes in city dump), rev'd and remanded on other grounds, 203 N.J. Super. 15, 495 A.2d
886 (1985); Buckeye Union Ins. Co. v. Liberty Solvents & Chems. Co., 17 Ohio App. 3d 127,
, 477 N.E.2d 1227, 1233 (1984) (holding that occurrence took place when drum discharged
chemicals into environment).
51. 199 N.J. Super. 558, 565-66, 489 A.2d 1265, 1269 (1984), rev'd and remanded on
other grounds, 203 N.J. Super. 15, 495 A.2d 886 (1985).
52. CPS Chem. Co. v. Continental Ins. Co., 199 N.J. 558, 565-66 A.2d 1265, 1269
(1984).
53. Id. at 563, 489 A.2d at 1267. In CPS Continental Insurance Company (Continental)
issued a CGL policy effective from 1974 to 1975 to cover the company against a third party's
bodily injury and property damage. Id. United States Fidelity & Guaranty (USFG) issued a
CGL policy effective from 1975 through 1977. Id. Thus, the consecutive terms of the policies
ran from 1974 through 1977. Id.
54. Id. at 566, 489 A.2d at 1268. In CPS the policy defined an occurrence as "an
accident, including continuous or repeated exposure to conditions, which results in bodily
injury or property damage neither expected nor intended from the standpoint of the insured."
Id.
55. Id. at 562, 489 A.2d at 1267. In CPS the plaintiff contracted with ABM Disposal
Company to remove toxic wastes from the plaintiff's plant site. Id. The plaintiff intended for
ABM Disposal Company to dispose of the wastes properly. Id. However, ABM Disposal
Company illegally dumped the plaintiff's wastes in the City of Philadelphia's dump on sixteen
different occasions beginning in 1974 and continuing until 1975. Id.
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dump.5 6 After discovering the hazardous wastes in the dump site, the city
sued the insured to recover the government's clean up costs under the
liability provisions of CERCLA.5 7 The insurance companies subsequently
filed a declaratory judgment action to determine whether the insurance
companies must defend and indemnify the insured in the city government's
suit. 8
In ruling on the insurance companies' declaratory judgment action, the
New Jersey Superior Court in CPS adopted the exposure rule and held that
the insurance companies must indemnify the insured for property damage
even though the city discovered the damage after the policy period had
expired. 59 The court in CPS reasoned that the city did not have to discover
the property damage during the policy periods for the policies to cover the
city's claim because the language of the policies did not limit coverage to
property damage occurring during the policy period.6 Moreover, the superior
court stated that the dumping of the wastes constituted an occurrence within
the meaning of the policy because the insured did not intend for the
contracted company illegally to dump the wastes. 6' The court noted that
the language of the policy defined an occurrence as an unintended event
from the standpoint of the insured. 62 Accordingly, the CPS court found
that the policy covered the city government's claim against the insured and
ordered the defendant to defend and, if necessary, to indemnify the plaintiff
against the city's claim for clean up costs. 63
In a case involving facts similar to CPS, the Court of Appeals of Ohio
also adopted the exposure rule to determine when property damage takes
place from hazardous waste exposure.64 In Buckeye Union Insurance v.
Liberty Solvents and Chemicals Co. 65 an insurance company issued a policy
56. Id.
57. Id. In CPS the City of Philadelphia sought reimbursement from the plaintiff company
of the costs the city incurred in cleaning up the hazardous wastes, as well as consequential
damages and penalties. Id. The city filed the suit pursuant to CERCLA and certain state codes
and statutes. Id.
58. CPS, 199 N.J. Super. at 558, 489 A.2d at 1267.
59. Id. at 565-66, 489 A.2d at 1269.
60. See supra note 54 and accompanying text (explaining definition of occurrence in
CPS policies).
61. CPS, at 564, 489 A.2d at 1269.
62. Id.
63. Id. In CPS the New Jersey court acknowledged that its holding was based on the
City of Philadelphia's allegations in the city's complaint against the plaintiff company. Id.
Thus, the court stated that since the city's complaint alleged an occurrence under the company's
insurance policy, the insurer had a duty to defend the company in the city's action against
the company. Id. However, even though the court concluded upon its review of the city's
complaint that the complaint alleged an occurrence, the court noted that the court hearing the
city's action against the company would ultimately determine the factual accuracy of the
complaint. Id. at 566 n.1, 489 A.2d at 1269 n.1.
64. Buckeye Union Ins. v. Liberty Solvents & Chems. Co., 17 Ohio App. 3d 127, __,
477 N.E.2d 1227, 1233 (1984).
65. 17 Ohio App. 3d 127, 477 N.E.2d 1227 (1984).
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that insured the company against all property damage caused by an occur-
rence. 66 The company stored hazardous substances in drums that leaked and
polluted the water and soil.6 7 The United States filed suit against the
company under CERCLA for the costs of cleaning up the hazardous
wastes. 6 The insurance company subsequently filed a declaratory judgment
action to determine whether the insurer had a duty to defend and indemnify
the company against the claims alleged by the government. 69
In holding that the insurer had a duty to defend and possibly indemnify
the company against the government's claims, the court in Buckeye adopted
the exposure rule and held that the release of hazardous wastes resulting in
property damage constituted an occurrence within the meaning of the
policy. 70 The court interpreted broadly the term occurrence to include not
only an event that simultaneously results in damage, but an event that
continuously causes damage over time.7' The court reasoned that the release
of hazardous wastes, causing slow and degenerative damage constituted an
occurrence. 72 Furthermore, the court found that while the company meant
to dump the wastes, the company did not realize the drums would release
the hazardous wastes and cause the property damage.73 Therefore, the court
66. Id. at -, 477 N.E.2d at 1232. In Buckeye the insurance policy defined an
occurrence as "an accident, including continuous or repeated exposure to conditions, which
results in . . .property damage neither expected nor intended from the standpoint of the
insured." Id.
67. Id. at -, 477 N.E.2d at 1229. In Buckeye the State of Ohio originally filed a
declaratory action against the defendant company and thirty seven other individuals in
connection with the clean up of Chem-Dyne's facility. Id. The defendant company was a
generator of hazardous wastes. Id. The defendant contracted with another company, Chem-
Dyne Corp., to remove and dispose the defendant's hazardous wastes. Id. Chem-Dyne operated
a hazardous waste facility. Id. After removing the hazardous wastes from the defendant
company's facility, Chem-Dyne brought the wastes to Chem-Dyne's facility and stored the
wastes in drums. Id. Exposed to the weather, many of the drums began to deteriorate. Id. at
-, 477 N.E.2d at 1231. In addition, the complaint alleged that Chem-Dyne had stacked
the drums on top of each other and many of the drums had ruptured. Id. As a result, the
drums released hazardous wastes into the environment causing the alleged property damage.
Id. at -, 477 N.E.2d at 1229.
68. Id. In Buckeye the action arose from another suit in which the state and federal
government sought reimbursement for the costs of cleaning up a hazardous waste site. Id. The
defendant company notified the insurance company of the pending suits after the United States
and the State of Ohio filed suit against the company. Id. The company requested the insurer
to defend the company against the suits filed by the state and federal government under the
terms of the insurance policy. Id. at -, 477 N.E.2d at 1229-30. Th6 insurer responded by
filing a declaratory judgment action to determine the insurance company's duty under the
insurance policy. Id. at -, 477 N.E.2d at 1230. The trial court reviewed summary judgment
motions filed by both parties and ruled that the insurance company had no duty to defend
because the state and federal government's complaints failed to allege an occurrence within
the meaning of the policy. Id. Accordingly, the company appealed the ruling to the Court of
Appeals of Ohio. Id.
69. Id. at _ , 477 N.E.2d at 1230.
70. Id. at __, 477 N.E.2d at 1232-33.
71. Id.
72. Id. at , 477 N.E.2d at 1233.
73. Id.
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held that the insurance company had a duty to defend and possibly to
indemnify the company against the government's claims.7 4
The majority of courts construing an occurrence within the meaning of
an insurance policy have done so in cases that involve property damage
from causes other than hazardous waste exposure.7 5 These courts have
generally adopted the injury in fact rule to determine when an occurrence
takes place.76 For example, in United States Fidelity and Guaranty Co. v.
American Insurance Co. (USF&G),7 the Second District Court of Appeals
of Indiana applied the injury in fact rule to determine when an occurrence
takes place. 78 In USF&G several insurance companies had issued liability
policies for consecutive periods of time to cover bricks manufactured by
the insured.7 9 United States Fidelity and Guaranty Company (the Initial
Insurer) covered the insured during the first of the three policy periods;
Employers Commercial Union Insurance Company of America and Amer-
ican Insurance Company covered the insured during the two policy periods
following the expiration of the Initial Insurer's policy.80 Thus, the insurance
policies covered the insured for consecutive policy periods from 1971 to
1974.81 The insured's bricks spalled or deteriorated and slowly damaged the
structure of a third party's building.82 Accordingly, the insured sought a
74. Id.
75. See Chesler, Rodburg & Smith, supra note 6, at 54 (noting that few courts have
considered when property damage occurs from hazardous waste exposure); Insurers' Liability
Under CERCLA, supra note 6, at 275 (noting that few courts have decided which rule to
apply when deciding when property damage occurs in suits involving CERCLA litigation).
76. See, e.g., Bartholomew v. Appalachian Ins. Co., 655 F.2d 27, 28 (1st Cir. 1981)
(stating that time of occurrence is time complaining party was in fact injured); Millers Mut.
Fire Ins. Co. of Texas v. Ed Bailey, Inc., 103 Idaho 377, 379, 647 P.2d 1249, 1251 (1982)
(stating that Louisiana is only jurisdiction that does not apply injury in fact rule to determine
time of occurrence within the meaning of liability indemnity policy); Continental Casualty Co.
v. Gilbane Bldg. Co., 391 Mass. 143, 152, 461 N.E.2d 209, 215 (1984) (stating that time of
occurrence is time event causes damage to complaining party).
77. 169 Ind. App. 1, 345 N.E.2d 267 (1976).
78. United States Fidelity and Guar. Co. v. American Ins. Co., 169 Ind. App. 1,
345 N.E.2d 267, 270 (1976).
79. Id. at __ , 345 N.E.2d at 267-68. In USF&G United States Fidelity and Guaranty
Company (the Initial Insurer) insured the plaintiff insured during the first of the three policy
periods against property damage occurring during the policy period. Id. Employers Commercial
Union Insurance Company of America (Employers) and American Insurance Company (Amer-
ican) (hereinafter collectively referred to as the Subsequent Insurers), covered the plaintiff
during the two policy periods following the expiration of the Initial Insurer's policy. Id. at -
, 345 N.E.2d at 268. Accordingly, the policies covered the insured for consecutive policy
periods from 1971 to 1974, and the policies contained nearly identical provisions. Id. Essentially,
the policies covered the plaintiff insured against property damage caused by an occurrence.
Id. The policy defined an occurrence as "an accident . . . which results, during the policy




82. Id. In USF&G the plaintiff's bricks spalled or flaked throughout each of the three
policy periods. Id. As a result the bricks caused damage to the structure of a homeowner's
home. Id.
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declaratory judgment that the insurers had a duty to indemnify the insured
against the third party's claim for property damage to the building. s3 The
Initial Insurer argued that the damage to the property could be classified
into discrete injuries over time and maintained that each insurer's liability
was proportional to the amount of structural damage to the building
occurring during the applicable policy period.Y
Rejecting the Initial Insurer's argument that the damage to the property
could be classified into discrete injuries over time, the USF&G court found
that the Initial Insurer was the only insurer liable for the property damage
to the building.85 In so holding, the Indiana Court of Appeals adopted the
injury in fact rule to determine at what time the spalling bricks damaged
the building.16 The Indiana Court of Appeals reasoned that the initial
spalling of the bricks indicated that the overall structure of the building
was defective.8 7 Moreover, the court reasoned that spalling of bricks is a
slow process and, therefore, the complainant might need years before being
able to determine the scope of damage to the building's structure.88 Ac-
cordingly, the USF&G court found that the injury in fact rule facilitated
the court's analysis in deciding which insurer was liable for the property
83. Id. In USF&G the plaintiff insured filed suit in the Superior Court of Marion County,
Indiana against the insurance companies. Id.
84. Id. at -, 345 N.E.2d at 270. In USF&G the Initial Insurer unsuccessfully argued
that a certain number of bricks spalled during each policy period. Id. at __, 345 N.E.2d at
272. Under the Initial Insurer's reasoning, a separate and distinct injury to the building
occurred during each policy period. Id. Accordingly, the Initial Insurer contended that its
liability under the policy extended only to the number of bricks that had spalled during the
policy period. Id. The Subsequent Insurers contended, however, that the Initial Insurer was
liable for the entire damage to the structure caused by the spalling bricks. Id. at -, 345
N.E.2d at 270. Under the Subsequent Insurers' theory, the complainant homeowner's discovery
of the spalling bricks was indicative of the amount of damage that would accrue to the entire
structure. Id. Thus, the Subsequent Insurers reasoned that the building fully depreciated in
value upon the complainant's discovery of the spalling bricks even though the building had
not undergone as much damage as the building underwent after the initial discovery of the
spalling bricks. Id. Accordingly, the Subsequent Insurers argued that the Initial Insurer should
pay for the entire damage to the structure. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. at -, 345 N.E.2d at 270. In USF&G the Indiana Court of Appeals stated
that under the Initial Insurer's theory, a multiplicity of actions would arise from the distinct
injuries occurring in each policy period. Id. at __, 345 N.E.2d at 272; see supra note 84
(describing Initial Insurer's theory of liability). The court noted the difficulty of determining
the actual extent of damage since the assessment could take years. USF&G, 169 Ind. App. I,
-, 345 N.E.2d 267, 272. The court rejected the Initial Insurer's theory that a distinct injury
occurred during each policy period. Id. at -, 345 N.E.2d at 272. The court of appeals
reasoned that even though physical damage was initially slight, the initial property damage
substantially depreciated the property's value. Id. Therefore, the Indiana Court of Appeals
adopted the injury in fact rule and held that the Initial Insurer was liable for all of the damage
to the structure of the building. Id. In so holding, the court noted that the actual damage to
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damage.8 9 Thus, the-court found the Initial Insurer liable for the property
damage upon the insured's showing that part of the damage had actually
occurred during the policy period. 90
Other courts deciding whether an insurance company must defend and
indemnify an insured in cases involving degenerative injury have adopted
combinations of the manifestation and exposure rule. 91 For example, in
Keene Corp. v. Insurance Co. of North America,92 the United States Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit adopted both the manifes-
tation rule and exposure rule (the triple trigger rule) to determine when
bodily injury from asbestos exposure occurs.93 In Keene the company
manufactured certain products containing asbestos from 1948 to 1972. 94
Insurance companies had issued general liability insurance policies covering
the company against any bodily injury to a person caused by an occurrence
during the policy period. 95 After numerous parties had filed suits against
the company for asbestos related injuries, the company sought a declaratory
judgment to determine whether any of the insurance companies had a duty
to defend or indemnify the company against claims for asbestos injury.96
89. Id. at , 345 N.E.2d at 271-72.
90. Id. at , 345 N.E.2d at 272.
91. See, e.g., Lac d'Amiante du Quebec, Ltd. v. American Home Assurance Co., 613
F. Supp. 1549, 1561 (D.N.J. 1985) (adopting triple trigger rule and holding insurers liable for
property damage resulting from asbestos exposure); Transamerica Ins. Co. v. Bellefonte Ins.
Co., 490 F. Supp. 935, 939 (E.D. Pa. 1980) (adopting double trigger rule and holding,
therefore, that insurer covering insured at time of exposure and insurer covering insured when
complainant discovered injury were liable under respective policies); Gruol Construction Co.
v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., I Wash. App. 632, 635-37, 524 P.2d 427, 430-31 (1974) (adopting
triple trigger rule and holding, therefore, that insurance covered claims for damages to building
caused by dry rot).
92. 667 F.2d 1034 (D.C. Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 1007 (1982).
93. Keene Corp. v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 667 F.2d 1034, 1047 (D.C. Cir. 1981), cert
denied, 445 U.S. 1007 (1982).
94. Id. at 1038-39. In Keene Insurance Company of North America (INA), Liberty
Mutual Insurance Company (Liberty), Aetna Casualty and Surety Company (Aetna) and
Hartford Accident and Indemnity Company (Hartford) (hereinafter referred to collectively as
the defendants) insured the company against liability arising during CGL insurance policies
issued consecutively from December 31, 1961 until 1980. Id. at 1038. Prior to and during the
CGL policy periods, the company manufactured thermal insulation products. Id. The company's
products contained asbestos and the products allegedly caused injury to persons exposed to
the products. Id. As a result, the injured parties or their survivors filed suits against the
company. Id. Accordingly, the company filed a declaratory judgment action against the
defendants to determine the defendants' rights and obligations to defend and possibly indemnify
the company against the injured parties' claims for bodily injury. Id.
95. Id. at 1039. In Keene the CGL policies defined an occurrence as "an accident,
including injurious exposure to conditions, which results, during the policy period, in bodily
injury . . . neither expected nor intended from the standpoint of the insured." Id.
96. Id. at 1038. In Keene thousands of injured persons filed suits against the plaintiff
company. Id. The complaints typically alleged that the complainant suffered personal injury
or wrongful death as a result of exposure or inhalation of asbestos from the company's
products. Id. In the Keene action, therefore, the company sought a declaratory judgment to
determine the extent of coverage of the respective policies issued by the defendants. Id. In
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Holding that the insurance companies had a duty to defend and possibly
indemnify the company against the asbestos related claims, the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit adopted the triple
trigger rule.9 7 Under the triple trigger rule, any insurance company that
covered the company against claims during the time of the complainant's
exposure to asbestos, the time of the complainant's discovery of the injury,
or at any time in between the exposure and discovery periods was liable
for the claims. 98 The Keene court found that exposure to asbestos did not
cause an immediate injury, but resulted in continuous and degenerative
bodily injury which might take years before manifesting as an asbestos
related disease.9 The court stated that if the policy covered only those
claims the complainant discovered during the policy period, the insurance
coverage would restrain the insurer's reasonable expectation of coverage.' °°
response to the allegations in the company's complaint, the defendants argued different theories
to support their argument that the insurers had no duty to indemnify the company under the
issued policies. See id. at 1039 (describing defendants' respective arguments of non-liability).
Aetna, INA and Liberty argued that the court should adopt the manifestation rule to determine
the time of bodily injury under the defendants' respective policies. Id. at 1042-43. Aetna, INA
and Liberty had issued the policies covering the company during the first three policy periods.
Id. at 1038-39. Under the manifestation rule, Aetna, INA and Liberty would not be liable for
the claims alleged against the company because the asbestos related disease did not appear
until after the policy periods had expired. Id. at 1042-43.
Hartford argued that a person's exposure to asbestos triggers insurance coverage. Id. at
1042. In advocating the court's adoption of the exposure rule, Hartford contended, however,
that each of the defendants' respective liability under the policies was proportional to the
length of time the policy covered the company during the time the injured parties were exposed
to the asbestos products. Id. at 1042 & n.15. Alternatively, the insured company contended
that the court should adopt the triple trigger rule. Id. at 1042. The company argued that the
triple trigger rule was the appropriate rule to apply because damage from asbestos begins at
the time a person is exposed to asbestos and continues until the time the disease manifests
itself. Id. Thus, the company contended that the policies covered the claims since the asbestos
exposure and subsequent gradual progression of injury occurred during the course of the policy
periods. Id. The company offered evidence to show that a person's body suffers injury at the
time the person inhales asbestos. Id. The asbestos fiber lodges immediately in the person's
lungs and the body reacts to the fiber, precipitating injury to the body. Id. Because asbestos
causes injury to a person from the time of the person's initial exposure to asbestos until some
future date, the company argued that the triple trigger rule was the most realistic rule to
determine when bodily injury takes place. Id.
97. Id. at 1046.
98. Id. at 1042.
99. Id. at 1040. In Keene the court distinguished the majority of injury cases from an
injury resulting from asbestos. Id. The court stated that in most cases, the injury occurs
simultaneously with the occurrence resulting in the injury. Id. However, the court noted that
injury from asbestos exposure might take years before the injured party discovered the injury.
Id. Moreover, the Keene court conceded that no one knows the extent of exposure necessary
to cause asbestoses. Id. .
100. Id. at 1045. In Keene the court reasoned that the purpose of insurance is to provide
certainty for the insured in the future. Id. Accordingly, the court reasoned that adopting the
manifestation rule would circumvent the insured company's reasonable expectation of coverage
if the court forced the insured to bear the risk of a latent disease. Id. In addition, the Keene
court looked to the reasonable expectations of the insured when the insurer issued the policies
1988]
WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 45:797
As a result, the Court of Appeals reasoned that the insured constantly
would remain uncertain of the insured's liability after the policy expires
because under the manifestation rule the insurer would only provide coverage
for the fraction of the injury appearing during the policy period.'0' Sup-
porting its holding on the basis of the insured's expectation of insurance
coverage, the court in Keene held that an occurrence takes place from the
time of exposure until the complainant discovers the injury. 10 2
In litigation arising from insurance claims for damage caused by ex-
posure to hazardous wastes as well as other substances, courts have reached
different results in deciding the time of an occurrence. 0 3 In construing the
time of an occurrence courts look to different factors to determine when
damage takes place. °4 First, courts consider the nature of the event or
substance causing the damage. 0 5 Therefore, a court determines whether the
damage takes place simultaneously with the event causing the damage or
whether the damage is degenerative and takes place over time.' °6 Second,
and stated that an insured purchases insurance to substitute certain premium payments for
uncertain future liability. Id. at 1046. Thus, the court construed the ambiguity of the insurance
policy's definition of occurrence against the insurer. See id. at 1041-42 & n.12. Moreover, the
court in Keene noted that once science discovered the dangers of asbestos exposure, insurance
companies stopped providing sufficient coverage against injury resulting from asbestos exposure.
Id. at 1045. The court stated that unless the court adopted the manifestation rule in conjunction
with the exposure rule, the company would have no coverage for injuries discovered after
1976. Id. The court noted that in 1976 insurers became aware of asbestos related disease and
discontinued coverage against asbestos related injuries. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 1046. The Keene court supported the decision to adopt both the manifestation
and exposure rules on the basis that the manifestation of the asbestos disease resulted from
an injurious process. Id. The court ruled that to terminate the insurers' liability while the
damage was materializing was inconsistent with the purpose of insurance. Id. The court
maintained that once exposure to asbestos takes place, the asbestos fibers lodge in a person's
lungs and sets in motion the injurious process. Id.
103. See supra notes 14-18 and accompanying text (describing courts' use of various rules
to determine time of an occurrence involving insurance claim for damage and listing cases
which have adopted various rules).
104. See infra notes 105-110 and accompanying text (describing courts' analysis of certain
factors in interpreting time of occurrence in litigation involving insurance coverage for property
damage or bodily injury).
105. See, e.g., Continental Ins. Cos. v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical and Chem. Co., 811
F.2d 1180, 1190-91 (8th Cir.) (considering nature of property damage caused by hazardous waste
exposure and comparing damage from hazardous wastes to damage from asbestos), reh'g
granted, 815 F.2d 51 (1987); Keene, 667 F.2d at 1038 n.3 (considering nature of damage resulting
from asbestos exposure and finding that bodily injury occurs over time); United States Fidelity
and Guar. Co. v. American Ins. Co., 169 Ind. App. 1, -, 345 N.E.2d 267, 271-72 (1976)
(considering nature of damage to building from defective bricks) (USF&G).
106. See Continental Ins. Cos. v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical and Chem. Co., 811 F.2d
1180, 1190-91 (8th Cir. 1987) (stating that damage resulting from hazardous waste exposure
results in continuous damage and distinguishing hazardous waste damage from injury from
negligent act), reh'g granted, 815 F.2d 51 (1987); Keene, 667 F.2d at 1047 (stating that asbestos
results in continuous injury rather than distinct injury); United States Fidelity and Guar. Co.
v. American Ins. Co., 169 Ind. App. 1, -, 345 N.E.2d 267, 272 (1976) (stating that spalling
bricks result in continuous property damage, and rejecting theory that yearly damage to
building could be categorized as distinct injury during policy period).
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courts look to the language of the specific policy to determine when an
occurrence takes place within the meaning of the insurance policy.' 7 Spe-
cifically, courts look at the policy's definitions of property damage and
occurrence.108 Third, courts attempt to adopt a rule that is consistent with
the insured's reasonable expectation of insurance coverage.' °9 Accordingly,
courts generally adopt the rule that provides insurance coverage for the
insured's claim." 0
The first factor that courts examine to determine when property damage
has occurred is the nature of the substance causing the property damage."'
As other courts have considered the nature of the substance causing damage,
the Fourth Circuit in Mraz correctly noted that unlike most property damage
or bodily injury covered under an insurance policy, damage resulting from
hazardous waste exposure is degenerative and often latent for many years
before appearing as an injury."2 Thus, the Mraz court rejected the injury
in fact rule because of the difficulty an injured party encounters in deter-
mining when latent damage begins to occur."' Courts would find the injury
in fact rule nearly impossible to apply because parties handling hazardous
wastes generally bury the toxic substances underground; therefore, damage
to the property may begin underground at an undeterminable date and long
before the damage appears above ground." 4 Accordingly, the Fourth Circuit
correctly chose the manifestation rule to determine when hazardous waste
107. See Continental Ins. Co. v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical and Chem. Co., 811 F.2d
1180, 1188-89 (8th Cir.) (reviewing language of insurance policy to determine meaning of policy),
reh'g granted, 815 F.2d 51 (1987); Buckeye Union Ins. Co. v. Liberty Solvents and Chems.
Co., 17 Ohio App. 127, -, 477 N.E.2d 1227, 1232-33 (1984) (reviewing language of insurance
policy to determine whether policy covered claim).
108. See supra note 107 and accompanying text (indicating courts' consideration of policy
language in interpreting time of occurrence).
109. See Keene Corp. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 667 F.2d 1034, 1042 n.12 (D.C. Cir.
1981) (considering insured's reasonable expectation of insurance coverage in determining time
of occurrence), cert denied, 455 U.S. 1007 (1982); Buckeye Union Ins. Co. v. Liberty Solvents
and Chems. Co., 17 Ohio App. 127, -, 477 N.E.2d 1227, 1233 (1984) (ascertaining lay
person's interpretation of occurrence within meaning of insurance policy).
110. See Keene Corp. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 667 F.2d 1034, 1047 (D.C. Cir. 1981)
(adopting triple trigger rule which provided maximum insurance coverage for insured's claims),
cert denied, 455 U.S. 1007 (1982); Buckeye Union Ins. Co. v. Liberty Solvents and Chems.
Co., 17 Ohio App. 127, -, 477 N.E.2d 1227, 1233 (1984) (adopting exposure rule which
provided insurance coverage for insured's claims).
111. Mraz v. Canadian Universal Ins. Co., 804 F.2d 1325, 1328 (4th Cir. 1986).
112. See id. (stating that property damage from hazardous waste exposure was continuous
and degenerative); supra note 71 and accompanying text (stating that property damage resulting
from hazardous waste exposure was continuous in Buckeye).
113. Mraz, 804 F.2d at 1328.
114. Compare supra note 43 and accompanying text (discussing difficulty of applying
exposure rule or injury in fact rule in cases involving hazardous wastes in Mraz); with supra
note 86-88 and accompanying text (discussing difficulty of determining the extent of damage
caused by spalling bricks in USF&G) and supra notes 99-102 (discussing Keene court's reasons
for rejecting manifestation rule in favor of triple trigger rule).
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damage occurs.' The manifestation rule is the better rule for courts to
apply in cases involving hazardous waste damage because the rule is objective
and avoids courts speculating when latent property damage occurred.,
6
The second factor that courts examine to determine when property
damage has occurred within the meaning of an insurance policy is the
language of the insurance policy. 1 7 The insurance policy's language also
supports the Fourth Circuit's decision in Mraz to adopt the manifestation
rule." 8 The Fourth Circuit in Mraz correctly analyzed the ambiguous lan-
guage of the policy which defined an occurrence as exposure to conditions
during the policy period which results in property damage. " 9 Accordingly,
the court found that the policy limited coverage to property damage occur-
ring during the policy period. 20 Even though courts tend -to construe
ambiguous provisions of an insurance policy against the insurer, the Fourth
Circuit correctly construed the Mraz policy against the insured plaintiffs by
finding that the policy did not cover the government's claim for property
damage.' 2' Unlike most parties to an insurance contract, both the plaintiffs
and the defendant had equal bargaining power in negotiating the terms of
the insurance policy. '2
The third factor that courts consider in determining when property
damage takes place within the meaning of an insurance policy is the insured's
reasonable expectation of coverage. 23 As the Keene court noted, parties
obtain insurance to avoid uncertainty against future liability. 24 While an
insured can not expect an insurance company to remain liable for claims
arising years after a policy has expired, the latent and degenerative nature
115. See supra notes 111-16 and accompanying text (discussing benefits of applying the
manifestation rule in cases involving hazardous wastes).
116. See supra notes 111-16 and accompanying text (discussing benefits of applying the
manifestation rule in cases involving hazardous waste).
117. See supra notes 107-08 and accompanying text (stating that courts look to language
of policy to determine time of occurrence).
118. See supra note 22 and accompanying text (discussing language of insurance policies
in Mraz).
119. See Mraz, 804 F.2d at 1327 (analyzing ambiguous language in policy); supra notes
46-49 and accompanying text (analyzing language inoMraz insurance policy).
120. See supra notes 46-49 and accompanying text (describing Mraz court's analysis of
insurance policy provisions).
121. See Mraz, 804 F.2d at 1326 (describing parties to suit as corporate officers and
insurance company); supra note 100 and accompanying text (stating that courts construe
ambiguous terms in insurance policy against insurer).
122. See Arness & Eliason, supra note 7, at 950 (stating that when companies purchase
insurance, courts should not read insurance policy as contract of adhesion but as ordinary
contract).
123. See supra notes 109-10 and accompanying text (describing courts' attempt to adopt
rule to determine time of occurrence consistent with insured's reasonable expectation of
insurance coverage).
124. See Keene Corp. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 667 F.2d 1034, 1045 (D.C. Cir. 1981)
(stating that parties obtain insurance to avoid uncertainty against future liability), cert. denied,
455 U.S. 1007 (1982); supra notes 100-02 and accompanying text (discussing insured's reasonable
expectation of insurance coverage).
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of hazardous waste damage and the retroactive application of CERCLA
makes the triple trigger rule an attractive alternative to the Mraz holding.
125
The triple trigger rule holds insurers liable for any claims for property
damage as long as the policy was effective when the property was exposed
to the hazardous substances, the complainant discovered the damage during
the policy period, or at any time in between the time of exposure and
manifestation of the property damage. 26 The triple trigger rule is consistent
with the insured's reasonable expectation of insurance coverage in a case
arising under CERCLA's liability provisions.1 7 Generally litigation concern-
ing a party's liability under CERCLA, like the Mraz case, involves parties
that dumped hazardous wastes before Congress enacted CERCLA and in a
manner then consistent with government approved standards. 12 In Mraz
neither the company nor the government suspected that many of the resulting
claims would arise years after the company dumped the hazardous wastes.
29
As a result, the company did not foresee the necessity of continuing
insurance coverage. 30 While an insured can not reasonably expect an insurer
to remain infinitely liable under a policy the insurer issued, the Mraz court's
opinion does not indicate that the Fourth Circuit considered the plaintiffs'
reasonable expectation of insurance coverage.' Accordingly, the triple
trigger rule is consistent with an insured's reasonable expectation of insur-
ance coverage in and provides an attractive alternative to the manifestation
rule in cases involving CERCLA.1
3 2
In Mraz v. Canadian Universal Insurance Co. the United States Court
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that under a general liability policy,
an occurrence takes place at the time the complaining party discovers the
property damage caused by hazardous wastes. 33 While the Fourth Circuit's
125. See supra note 18 and accompanying text (describing the triple trigger rule); Arness
& Eliason, supra note 7, at 973 (suggesting that triple trigger rule is best rule to apply in
litigation involving insurance coverage for hazardous waste damage).
126. See supra note 18 and accompanying text (describing triple trigger rule); Arness &
Eliason, supra note 7, at 973 (suggesting that triple trigger rule is best rule to apply in litigation
involving insurance coverage for hazardous waste damage).
127. See supra notes 123-26 and accompanying text (discussing application of triple trigger
rule in cases involving latent damage).
128. See supra note 21 and accompanying text (noting that plaintiffs in Mraz had arranged
to dispose chemical wastes in cooperation with government officials).
129. See supra note 21 and accompanying text (indicating that plaintiffs and government
officials did not expect the drums or clay lined pit to leak).
130. See supra note 6 (stating that most litigation under CERCLA involves government
suits against parties with expired insurance policies); notes 21-25 and accompanying text (stating
that plaintiffs in Mraz discontinued insurance coverage after plaintiffs dumped hazardous
wastes).
131. Mraz v. Universal Ins. Co., 804 F.2d 1325, 1328 (4th Cir. 1986).
132. See supra notes 97-102 and accompanying text (discussing application of triple trigger
rule to determine time of damage in Keene); but see Arness and Eliason, supra note 7, at 945
(discussing need for courts to adopt consistent approach to determine insurance coverage for
property damage resulting from hazardous waste).
133. Mraz, 804 F.2d at 1328.
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holding contradicts the holdings of other courts deciding CERCLA cases,
courts can apply, without speculation, the manifestation rule to determine
whether an insurance policy covers a claim for hazardous wastes.' 34 Rather
than surmising when latent property damage from hazardous waste exposure
takes place, the manifestation rule enables courts objectively to determine
whether an insurer is liable for property damage based on the time a third
party or the insured discovers the property damage.'35 Moreover, the man-
ifestation rule provides insurance companies with an incentive to continue
providing insurance for companies handling hazardous wastes because the
manifestation rule prevents insurers from remaining liable under a policy
which expired years before the insured submitted a claim for property
damage. 36 Faced with the liability provisions of CERCLA and the Fourth
Circuit's adoption of the manifestation rule, counsel should advise clients
handling hazardous wastes to continue insurance coverage regardless of the
period of time that has elapsed since the client disposed the hazardous
substances. 37 So long as the insured continues to maintain insurance, the
Fourth Circuit's holding in Mraz will not jeopardize a company's future
uncertainty concerning liability for hazardous waste disposal. 38
MARY HOGE AcK.ERLY
134. See supra note 50 and accompanying text (listing cases adopting exposure rule in
CERCLA litigation to determine time of occurrence); but see supra notes 114-16 and accom-
panying text (indicating that Mraz court's adoption of manifestation rule facilitates court's
determination of whether insurance covers claim for property damage).
However, the Mraz court's holding promises to promote the uncertainty already abounding
in insurance litigation because no unifying factor reconciles the divergent rulings among courts
deciding when an occurrence takes place for insurance purposes. See Hadzi-Antich, supra note
I, at 781 (stating that courts determining when property damage occurs from hazardous wastes
should adopt uniform rule and eliminate confusion presently existing in insurance law con-
cerning time of occurrence in injury from causes other than hazardous wastes).
135. See supra note 134 and accompanying text (discussing advantages of courts using
manifestation rule to determine time property damage takes place).
136. See Statement of Dennis R. Connolly, Senior Counsel, American Insurance Assoc.
as reported in 14 Env't Rep. (BNA) (March 30, 1984) (stating that courts' tendency to find for
insured in insurance litigation will destroy solvency of insurance industry); Marcotte, Toxic
Blackacre: Unprecedented Liability for Landowners, A.B.A. J., Nov. 1, 1987, 66, 69 (stating
that The American Land Title Association excludes coverage for environmental damage from
policies).
137. See Marcotte, supra note 136, at 70 (noting that defendant company in New York
v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032 (2d Cir. 1985) filed bankruptcy after being sued for
government's clean up costs).
138. See supra note 124-32 and accompanying text (indicating that insured's reasonable
expectation of insurance coverage will be satisfied if insured continues to maintain insurance).
